More of Evidence of Vertical Integration

It seems with each passing week, more examples of the changing structure of technology companies emerge.  Just before the workday closed on the east coast of the US, the following headline was splashed across the Wall Street Journal “Apple in Advanced Talks to Buy Intel’s Smartphone-Modem Chip Business.”  The ultimate “Platform Company” from the 2000s is adding to their arsenal of chip IP and chip development teams.
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July 2019 Essay: Naval Lessons From the Lead Up to the First World War

My wife would tell you that for some reason I own far too many books on First World War Naval History.  Personally, I thoroughly enjoy the history of Europe post the German wars of Unification (>1871) through the outbreak of the First World War.  Some of my favorite college courses covered the treaty system of Bismarck and debates as to who was to blame for the outbreak of the First World War.   Over time, I have become familiar with the naval history of the First World War.  I think it might have started when I read Robert Massie’s book Dreadnaught.  My fascination with this period of history is both tactical and strategic in nature.
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Encountering the Hamilton Manifesto

More than five years ago James Hamilton of Amazon fame, posted on his personal blog a presentation he gave about networking called Datacenter Networks Are in My Way.   Here is a link to his post and my last check showed that the slides to the presentation are still available. I copied four of the slides in the thumbnail to the left to save the reader from a click out. Continue reading

Essay on Decision Loops – Part 3

In order to understand Boyd’s model for operations, we must understand his premise that there is a fundamental need for decisions. He states, “Against such a background, actions and decisions become critically important. Actions must be taken over and over again and in many different ways. Decisions must be rendered to monitor and determine the precise nature of the actions needed that will be compatible with the goal. To make these timely decisions implies that we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change. The concepts can then be used as decision-models for improving our capacity for independent action. Such a demand for decisions that literally impact our survival causes one to wonder: How do we generate or create the mental concepts to support this decision-making activity?” [see Boyd, Destruction and Creation]. This quote highlights the basic contribution that Boyd provided. He developed a model that can be extrapolated into a process for decision-making. Boyd called the model he developed the O-O-D-A loop. Continue reading

Essay on Decision Loops – Part 2

Post the end Vietnam War and the entrance of America in the 1970s, it seemed that America had lost their way. The mathematicians and hard science was again in decline and the philosophical and social sciences came to the fore. It would be in the 1990s, that hard science and mathematics would once again gain a dominant position in thought leadership. Out of the counterforce debacle in Vietnam and the dominance of defense and public policy by neoclassical theories, emerged John Boyd who developed a philosophy and process that formulates strategy based on all data and uses dynamic analytics to continuously evolve strategy to achieve objectives. This is not a game theory strategy that mathematically outlines various outcomes based on strategies employed. It is not a precise mathematical formula that defines risk. Boyd believed that strategy is an ever evolving and highly iterative process designed to achieve victory. It requires assumptions of risk with constant analytics of the operating environment. Boyd believed that the real target was your enemy’s perception for it is enemy who decides when they are defeated – not you. Keynes would describe this as the participants in the financial market who decide when you have won or lost – it is the not the companies. In the business market it is the companies competing for market share who decide when they have lost. Continue reading

Essay on Decision Loops – Part 1

In 1928 a young, brilliant mathematician named John van Neumann, devised a theory that would affect economic and military thought for many years to come. The theory that Neumann developed was based upon several observations he made during a game of poker. The first observation was that wining and losing was the interdependent on all players. A wining strategy was not solely based upon a single player’s strategy – but rather the product of all the player’s strategies. In order to devise a winning strategy, Neumann had to account for other player’s strategies, assuming that each player’s objective was to win the game. From these observations Neumann developed what became known as game theory and he applied the theory to economic markets. Previous economic models used traditional neoclassical economic assumptions that a seller and buyer acted solely on the mission to maximize their gains. A seller is looking to maximize profit and a buyer wants the maximum value for capital spent. The contribution that Neumann made was to define a seller and buyer as a transactional unit that was dependent upon each other, but not necessarily to achieve maximize profits and value for capital. Continue reading

Does SDN, DevOps and Agile Infrastructures Require an Abandonment of Taylorism?

I posted last week about a sales call gone wrong and an innovator’s dilemma moment. Since that time I have had additional customer and internal engagements that caused me to think about what I call institutionalized impedance, which might be more familiar to a broader audience if I called it Taylorism or scientific measurement. Continue reading

Charles VIII and the Emerging Modern IT Force

I am careful with the use of the term revolution.  This discipline comes from my academic studies and too many years studying actual revolutions and revolutionaries.  We can debate the impact of technological advances on the field of battle, but these advances would be limited if they were not organized, trained and led with purpose.  I understand the impact of the percussion cap and rifled barrel, but it is the adoption and use of the technological that is important — not the invention of the technology in isolation. Continue reading

SDN, It’s Free just like a Puppy!

I have written both and will post at the same time because I believe we are conflating many issues when it comes to networking.  For example: SDN, ONF, OpenFlow, Overlays, Underlays, Tunneling, VXLAN, STT, White Box, Merchant Silicon, Controllers, Leaf/Spine, Up, Down, Top, Bottom, DIY, Cloud, Hybrid, NetContainers, Service Chaining, DevOps, NoOps, SomeOps, NFV, Daylight, Floodlight, Spotlight to name a few.  Both of these posts are intended to be read back to back.  I wrote them in two parts to provide an intentional separation.
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It is all about Doctrine (I am talking about Networking and that SDN thing)

Last year, I wrote a long post on doctrine.  I was reminded of that post three times this week.  The first was from a Plexxi sales team who was telling me about a potential customer who was going to build a traditional switched hieracrhical network as test bed for SDN.  When I asked why they were going to do that, they said the customer stated because it was the only method (i.e. doctrine) his people had knowledge of and it was just easier to do what they have always done.  The second occurrence was in a Twitter dialog with a group of industry colleagues across multiple companies (some competitors!) and one of the participants referenced doctrine as a means for incumbents to lock out competitors from markets.  The third instance occurred at the at the Credit Suisse Next-Generation Datacenter Conference when I was asked what will cause people to build networks differently.  Here are my thoughts on SDN, networking, doctrine, OPEX and building better networks.
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Doctrine, ROI, the Low Entropic Dogmatic State of the Network and SDNs

The other day I read this post on learning to escape the ROI trap.  I think Chuck and Polly’s transposition of the phrase “return on investment” to “risk of ignoring” is intriging.  Chuck’s meme on how he dislikes the use of the concept of ROI influenced me to think more about the concept of doctrine.  Readers of my blog will know that I have been randomly thinking about the concept of doctrine.  I am going to point out that if you are expecting a pithy post on SDNs, OpenFlow, networking or equity charts, this is not that post and you might want to skip to the last paragraph.

I have been thinking about the concept of doctrine and how it is employed in technology companies and the creative pulse of the technology industry for some time.  I have worked in five startups and two large public companies.  I never really thought about the concept of doctrine until I was motivated to write the Tubthumping post in February 2012.  In that post I wrote the following:

“The concept of doctrine enables technology people to make assumptions.  Assumptions are great as long as they hold.  When I refer to doctrine I am referring to procedures that ecosystem participants follow because they have been trained to reason and act in a certain manner within the command and control structure of their business and technology.  We design networks, manage companies; evaluate technology and markets according to a common set of doctrines that have been infused into the technology ecosystem culture over many decades.  I was thinking along this thought line in mid-October when I posted “I also believe we are all susceptible to diminished breadth in our creativity as we get older.  Diminished breadth in our creativity the root cause as to why history repeats itself and another reason why when we change companies we tend to take content and processes from our prior company and port them to our new company.  This is especially true in the technology industry.  We recycle people; hence we recycle ideas, content and value propositions from what worked before.  Why be creative when it is easier to cut and paste?  As a casual observation it seems to me that most people working in tech have a theta calculation as to their creativity.  I believe a strategy to guard against creativity decay is to look back on the past and critique the work.”  In mid October I had not fully fused the thesis of creativity fail or creativity theta with doctrine.  The idea to link the two concepts occurred to me last night as I was reading Shattered Sword for the second time.”

I did a search of my blog and found eight entries in which I mentioned or used the word doctrine to imply a specific meaning or invoke an association in my mind or the reader’s mind.  I want to explore that concept further.  A book I am currently reading is Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat by Wayne P. Hughes; side note I am also reading The Crimean War: A History, which is a very dense book to read.  Fleet Tactics is the book that has most influenced my recent thinking on concept of doctrine in technology companies, but I would state in 2002-2003 I was greatly influenced by the ideas put forward by John Boyd.

Allow me to digress as I stitch together (I really enjoy that abstraction) some concepts and history and then apply them to the business of technology.  In the book Shattered Sword, the authors put forth a novel thesis that when the Kido Butai arrived northwest of Midway Island on June 4 1942, and faced the American carrier force to northeast the battle was already lost due to doctrine.  I am not going to repeat the supporting elements of the thesis in the book, but the conclusion by the authors is that the innovation and power of the Kido Butai was finally defeated in the course of a single day because of the limiting effect of low entropic doctrine employed by the Imperial Japanese Navy.  If you are not familiar with naval military history a quick primer might be needed.  The Kido Butai was the formation of all the major Japanese aircraft carriers into an unified striking force.  The concentration of multiple carriers in a single, fast moving offensive striking force was a true innovation in naval combat.  Six Japanese carriers launched the strike on Pearl Harbor.  These carriers were organized into three air divisions and trained in unified operations as a single offensive weapon.  To create the Kido Butai required innovation in tactics and tactics are a result of doctrine.  Part of the thesis in Shattered Sword describes how innovation stopped and rigid adherence to doctrine in all levels of the IJN doomed the operational actions of the Kido Butai at the battle of Midway.  The authors point to the book Fleet Tactics to understand doctrine, which is why I was reading Fleet Tactics.

Pages 29-33 in Fleet Tactics has a concise summary of doctrine, why it is important and how it is employed.  Here is my summary of those pages in ten simple points.  Bonus points offered if while reading the points you can associate more than three to your current company:

1. P29: Doctrine is the commander’s way of controlling his forces in writing, before military action.

2. P29: Doctrine enunciates polices and procedures that govern action.

3. P29: In its stringiest sense, doctrine enjoins the right behavior; its success depends on obedience, except when obedience leads to failure.

4. P29: Two points of doctrine must be remembered: it is vital and it must not become dogmatic.

5. P30: Doctrine may also be thought of as every action that contributes to unity of purpose.

6. P30: Doctrine is not what is written in books; it is what people believe in and act on.

7. P30: In the execution of good doctrine, there is always tension between conformity and initiative.

8. P30: There is a measure of entropy in all doctrine.  With too little entropy there is order and understanding, but no initiative.  With too much entropy there is creativity and change but no order.

9. P31: The clearest evidence of doctrinal deficiency is too much communication.

10. P33: In sum doctrine must be whole and firm but not dogmatic.  It must leave room for men of freewheeling genius, for such will be the aces of the next war.  But it must never surrender control, because control is the prerequisite of concerted action.

Many of the ten points about doctrine were disconnected in my mind when I wrote the sometimes winning requires failure post.  In hindsight, that entire post is about doctrine.  When I wrote it, I was not mature in my thoughts around the concept of doctrine and the effect it has on an organization through high and low levels of entropy.  If I go back and read Chuck’s blog on the ROI trap in terms of doctrine, the entire post is about doctrine.  People are conditioned to act in a specific manner because of doctrine.  The example he cites is rife with points #7 and #9.  I think anyone who has had a decade of experience in the technology business has been part of ROI discussions or building solution cases based on “prior mode of operation (PMO) and future mode of operation (FMO).”

The more I think about the heartbeat of technology companies, it becomes more apparent that our industry is full of low entropy doctrine.  Take for example the idea around Moore’s Law which I have written about several times.  To me there is no better example of dogmatic doctrine in the technology industry than Moore’s Law; which was a product cycle observation.  For a couple of decades I have been listening to technology executives describe their business as following Moore’s Law.  For those who have made it this far, here is my reference to the network, SDN and all the other buzzwords.  The network is in a low entropy state dominated by doctrine and dogmatic beliefs.  It has become fixed, documented and institutionalized.  For it to change for the better, we need enough entropic doctrine for people to take the initiative because they fear the risk of ignoring (HT Chuck and Polly).  Fear of the risk of ignoring should be an element of every company’s operating doctrine.  Here is an example of how to spot doctrinal deficiency: a presenter has 100 slides to go through.